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Abstract 
We analyze geographic patterns of trade using transactions data from eBay and 
MercadoLibre, two large online auction sites. We find that distance continues to be an 
important deterrent to trade between geographically separated buyers and sellers, though 
at a lesser extent than has been observed in studies of non-Internet commerce. We also 
find a strong “home bias” towards trading with counterparties located in the same city. 
Further analyses suggest that cultural factors and the possibility of direct contract 
enforcement in case of breach are the main reasons behind the same city bias. 
I. Introduction 
 
An extensive literature in international economics analyzes the impact of distance on 
trade flows. The stylized finding of a large numbers papers estimating the “gravity 
equation” is that trade volume among two countries increases with the size of their 
economies and decreases with the distance that separates the countries. A subset of these 
papers also report a very significant “border effect”: controlling for distance, trade 
between two regions is much lower if the goods have to cross national borders. Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2004), in their recent review of this literature, point out transportation 
costs and tariffs/taxes as the main frictions contributing to the decline of trade flow with 
distance and the border effect. They also discuss a growing number of papers on 
“informational frictions.” Such informational frictions include search costs, which hinder 
geographically distant buyers and sellers from finding each other; communication 
barriers, which hinder efficiency of negotiations2; and, more generally, “contracting 
costs,” driven by the inability to monitor and sanction misconduct of distant transacting 
parties.3  
 
With the rise of the Internet, the question arises of whether the institutional environment 
of online commerce alters the impact of distance on trade flows. This paper analyzes 
geographic patterns of trade on two large online auction sites, eBay and MercadoLibre. 
eBay is the largest online auction site in the world, and our data is a representative 
sample of all eBay transactions conducted within the 48 continental U.S. states. 
MercadoLibre is the largest online auction site in Latin America; we chose to study this 
site mainly to check the robustness of our results obtained using eBay data, but also to 
understand whether additional geographic barriers to trade arise in the context of a less 
developed set of economies.  
                                                 
2 Portes and Rey (2002) find a negative correlation between telephone traffic and bank presence and the 
distance effect. 
3 Rauch and Trindade (2002) find that ethnic Chinese networks have increased bilateral trade flows 
between country pairs, and that in Southeast Asia, their effect is larger for differentiated products than for 
homogenous goods. Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer (2005) report that firm and immigrant networks are 
important facilitators of intra-France trade. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) show that country-level 
indices of institutional quality are associated with trade flows.    
 The online auction environment provides an interesting and unique opportunity to study 
the distance-dependence of trade, as the environment can be considered “frictionless” in 
certain important dimensions.4 First, search costs are practically nonexistent on these 
markets, since the computerized search interface matches buyers almost instantly with 
listings they might be interested in. Communication costs are also very low, given that 
most listings follow a fairly uniform format and language, and all transacting parties have 
access to e-mail for fast and reliable communication. As for shipping costs, a flat 
shipping fee is quoted by most eBay sellers for transactions within the continental U.S., 
largely equalizing this margin across different seller locations. 5 Note also that, within the 
continental U.S., tariffs are nonexistent, and sales taxes, which are imposed by the states, 
should encourage out-of-state purchases as opposed to within state purchases.  
                                                
     
Our main result is the following: even on eBay and MercadoLibre, distance has a strong 
negative effect on trade. This effect is highly non-linear, trading volume being 
abnormally high within the same city and abnormally low across country borders. Once 
beyond the driving distance of the city limits, the effect of distance on trade is relatively 
small between cities in the same state or country. Further results suggest that “trust” may 
be a significant contributor to the distance effect: we find that high ticket items (such as 
jewelry) have more difficulty crossing city limits, and that the “same city effect” is much 
more pronounced in those categories where the average seller reputation is lower. We 
also find some evidence that local tastes and item uniqueness have the opposite effect on 
the impact of distance on trade.  The same city effect is strongest in location-specific 
items such as tickets or sports memorabilia, and weakest in scarce items with universal 
appeal such as collectible coins.     
 
 
4 The “home bias” literature in finance can also be characterized as studying an environment that is 
similarly “frictionless.” For example, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find that mutual funds are likely to hold 
regionally-biased portfolios, arguing that monitoring costs may be an important factor.  
5 One may also consider the inconvenience caused by the time it takes one to ship objects a long distance as 
an unobserved shipping cost. However, while one would expect shipping time to vary linearly with 
distance, as described later in the paper, we find a highly nonlinear pattern of distance-dependence that 
varies very little between 50 and 2000 kilometers. 
Our paper is a close complement to the work of Blum and Goldfarb (2005), who analyze 
the web-surfing behavior of a panel of Internet users. They find that local tastes appear to 
be an important driver of digital goods consumption. Our work is distinct from Blum and 
Goldfarb’s in that we focus on physical goods trade on eBay and MercadoLibre, rather 
than on digital/media goods. Some of our findings reinforce their message regarding the 
importance of local tastes, though other findings point to factors such as trust as being 
another source of the observed home-bias on the Internet. Our work also relates to Freund 
and Weinhold (2000), who analyze the impact of Internet penetration across countries on 
cross-country trade patterns, and find that Internet connectivity is associated with 
increases in trade volume. Our results, along with Blum and Goldfarb’s findings, maybe 
interpreted as pointing out a potential limit for the ability of the Internet to reduce 
geographic barriers – while the Internet may help reduce the distance barrier, as Freund 
and Weinhold’s (2000) results show, factors such as lack of trust and local tastes may still 
render geography as an important factor in determining trade flows. Especially in 
understanding how informational frictions affect the geographical nature of trade, we 
contribute to the literature by showing that even in the absence of search frictions, 
information asymmetries, such as uncertainty regarding the reliability of a seller, may 
serve as an important trade barrier6 – and that proximity may serve as a substitute for 
trust.    Another potential implication of this finding is that the growth of online 
marketplaces may be limited by their ability to develop exchange-like clearing 
mechanisms that dissociate the flow of goods from the identity of market participants.  
Simply reducing search costs by creating online databases of buyers and sellers will not 
lead to the frictionless growth of the network of buyers and sellers.   
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
 
To motivate the analysis we will use a simple auction model with an exogenously 
determined number of participants.  The willingness of buyers to pay will depend on the 
                                                 
6 For example, Rauch and Trindade’s (1999) ingenious study of how Chinese immigrant networks affect 
trade does not distinguish between a search cost story, in which trading partners can not find each other, 
and an informational asymmetry story, in which trading partners do not trust each other.  
characteristics of the good auctioned and the characteristics of the seller, including the 
buyer’s geographical proximity to the seller.  Higher willingness to pay will lead to 
higher probability of winning the auction.  How distance among agents affects the 
willingness to pay will influence the probability of winning the auction, and therefore the 
number of transactions we should observe between agents from any pair of geographical 
locations. 
 
Let’s assume that in a certain auction there are S seller types and B buyer types.  We will 
assume that a type is defined by the individual’s geographical location, though it is easy 
to extend the concept of type to include other agent characteristics, such as reputation.  In 
the auction will participate Ns sellers of type s and Nb buyers of type b.  When a seller of 
type s, puts up an item for sale, the willingness to pay of a buyer of type b for the item, 
bsυ ,  will be: 
 
bsbsbs εµγυ ++=  
 
where γ is some fundamental value of the item auctioned, bsµ is the idiosyncratic 
valuation attached by buyer b on the item sold by seller s, and εbs is an IID random 
disturbance.  In its most simple interpretation, bsµ represents how the distance between 
the locations of seller s and buyer b affects the willingness to pay.  For instance, it is 
intuitive to think that buyer b will reduce her valuation by the cost of hauling the item 
from seller s’s location to her location, or that she will factor in tax differentials among 
locations. bsµ  may also be affected by the nature of the good being auctioned or the 
reputation of the seller.  For instance, distance will have more impact on more valuable 
items or on less reputable sellers because the cost of a recourse action increases with 
remoteness. 
 
If we assume that the auction mechanism is efficient—i.e., that it awards each good to the 
buyer with highest willingness to pay—, and that εbs follows a Type-I extreme value 
distribution we can express the probability that a buyer of type b wins an auction in 
which the good is sold by a seller of type s as  
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following multinomial logit choice probabilities (the  terms reflect the population 
weighting of buyers across locations). The more positive the effect of the distance µ
bN
b,s, 
the more likely the largest valuation will be drawn by a buyer of type b.  By the same 
token, the larger the number of buyers of type b, Nb, the more likely the highest valuation 
will occur in one buyer of this type.  Observe that if the geographical distance has no 
impact on a buyer’s valuation, the probability of winning the auction depends exclusively 
on the number of buyers of each type, and economies with a larger number of buyers will 
be more likely to buy the item. 
 
If we take logs in equation (1) we obtain the following expression, which is linear in the 
effect of distance µb,s and the log of the number of buyers of type b, Nb: 
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The total number of transactions between buyers of type b and sellers of type s (Tb,s) will 
depend on the total number of goods auctioned by sellers of type s (Ts) and the 
probability for buyers of type b to win those auctions.  Multiplying equation (1) by Ts we 
obtain the expected number of transactions between buyers of type b and sellers of type s.  
Taking logs and including a disturbance term, νb,s , we obtain the following expression of 
the Gravity equation: 
 
sbsbbsssb NTkT ,,, logloglog νµ ++++=     (3) 
 
where Tb,s is the total number of transactions between buyers of type b and sellers of type 
s, Ts is the total number of goods auctioned by sellers of type s, and ks is a constant term 
capturing the effect of the fundamental value of the good, γ, and the cs. 
 
The gravity equation suggests the following testable hypotheses: (1) The total number of 
transactions (we will repeat the analysis with the total dollar value of the transactions) 
between buyers of type b and sellers of type s, Tb,s is proportional to the size of the 
economy of the buyers, , and of the sellers, log ; (2) When all transactions are 
pooled in the analysis, the effect of distance on the intensity of trade, µ
bNlog tT
b,s, should be such 
that an increase in the distance between players should reduce the number of transactions; 
and (3) the impact of the of distance on the amount of trade will depend on the value of 
the item and the reputation of the seller. 
 
In the following section we describe the data used in the empirical analysis. 
 
III. Data Sources 
 
We developed this study with the data of two leading online auction sites: eBay, arguably 
the firm that invented the concept of online auctions, and the largest player in this 
industry; and MercadoLibre, leader of online auctions in Latin America.  Online auction 
sites are well-suited for our study not only because these firms are interested in 
minimizing the impact of distance to increase the size of their networks, but also because 
they are a good proxy for Internet commerce.  According to the Forrester Technographics 
survey, in 2004, close to 30% of U.S. households had bid in an Internet auction.  
Therefore, our results will be indicative of how geography may affect Internet trade. 
 eBay was founded by Pierre Omidyar in 1995 in San Jose.  Since then it has continuously 
grown to become the largest online auction site in the world.  In 2004 more than 1.4 
billion items were listed in eBay’s marketplace, resulting in a total of $34.2 billion worth 
of merchandise transacted.7  MercadoLibre was founded by Marcos Galperín in 1999 in 
Buenos Aires, is the leading Latin American online auction site.8.It operates in nine Latin 
American countries9 and had more than 9.5 million items transacted in 2004 for an 
aggregate value of $425 million  
 
The eBay data is the result of a stratified sampling of eBay listings taken between 
February and May 2004.  From each of the 30 main categories of items in eBay, we 
extracted a daily random sample. For each sampled listing, we obtained the description of 
the item being sold, the seller’s location, the shipping and handling fee posted by the 
seller, and other listing characteristics that might affect demand (such as the seller’s 
feedback rating, the insurance and payment methods allowed, listing time, etc.)  
Unfortunately, obtaining the buyer’s location was less straightforward, since eBay does 
not report the location of the buyers explicitly.  However, the buyer’s location can be 
obtained if the buyer has previously sold an item on eBay, and if that item’s listing is still 
recorded in the eBay database.  This allowed us to obtain the location of 27% of buyers in 
these transactions.  This missing data problem skews our sample towards recording the 
locations of buyers who are more “experienced” traders on eBay, as they have to be both 
buyers and sellers in a short period of time. 
 
MercadoLibre gave us comprehensive statistics of the geographic patterns of trade for its 
different websites.  Thus for any pair of buyer and seller locations (states/provinces), we 
have the number and amount of all the monthly transactions completed during the period 
                                                 
7 eBay Annual Report, 2004. 
8 http://www.mercadolibre.com.ar/argentina/ml/p_loadhtml?as_menu=MPRESS&as_html_code=SML_05, 
visited on September 11, 2005. 
9 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.  At the time of our 
study the Peru site was not yet operational.  
11 86% of MercadoLibre’s traffic is fixed price 
(http://www.mercadolibre.com.ar/argentina/ml/p_loadhtml?as_menu=MPRESS&as_html_code=SML_05 
as visited on September 12, 2005) 
August 2003 to July 2004.  We got this information for each of the main 30 categories of 
items in MercadoLibre (they are similar but not exactly parallel to eBay’s categories).  
For each pair of locations there is one observation for auction transactions and one for 
fixed price transactions.11  The advantage of having all the transactions in the database 
eliminates any measurement error associated with the sampling procedure used with the 
eBay data, but comes at the price of not being able to get all the listing characteristics that 
might affect demand.  Nevertheless, having the location information for all the buyers 
avoids the missing data problem of the eBay sample and allows the data obtained from 
MercadoLibre to act as a robustness check of our analyses. 
 
There are several reasons why these data sources are especially relevant not only for 
firms that try to expand their network of users but also for economists who try to 
understand the geography of trade, as they can help us to understand the sources of 
frictions that cause distance to have a negative impact in commercial activity.  First of all, 
these marketplaces are pure intermediaries that facilitate trade in a variety of goods.  
Thus, short of running a comprehensive census, focusing on these sites allows us to 
examine geographic trading patterns for a relatively large cross-section of product 
varieties, helping us to understand which product characteristics make trading more 
sensitive to distance.  Second, one may argue that the main benefit of the Internet as a 
trade facilitator is to reduce search costs, and it is reasonable to think of these 
marketplaces as being essentially “frictionless” in this regard.  Third, shipping and 
handling fees are often quoted explicitly by seller on these websites, and, for a wide class 
of goods, these fees apply uniformly to buyers of differing locations (at least within the 
same country).  Thus, shipping cost differentials across locations are effectively 
controlled for (except for variation in the time-of-arrival dimension). 
 
These features render eBay and MercadoLibre close approximations of the “unified 
marketplace” view of the Internet, though several caveats are in order.  First, the products 
that are bought and sold through these site, although encompassing a large variety, are 
mainly new and used household durables, and thus extrapolations to other goods 
categories is not possible.  Second, a similar “representativeness” criticism may also be 
leveled against the demographic characteristics of the users of these websites.  However, 
one may apply the same criticisms to the Internet trade in general.  At a minimum, our 
analyses may shed some light on what are the frictions behind the distance effect for 
goods and agents currently involved in Internet commerce, and provide hints on how to 
overcome these frictions. 
 
IV. Results from Analyses Aggregated at the State/Province Level  
 
In this section we analyze whether physical distance between buyer and seller reduces the 
intensity of Internet trade or not.  If the online auction sites are able to eliminate the 
frictions that have been traditionally attributed to the distance effect, we should observe 
no difference in the purchasing behavior of buyers when the seller is close or faraway.  
Specifically, in a regression framework based on equation (3), the variables that proxy for 
distance between buyer and seller should have no explanatory power when the dependent 
variables are measures of Internet trade. 
 
Table I presents our first test of the gravity equation with the eBay sample.  We include 
as benchmarks the results of Wolf (2000) and Hillberry and Hummels (2003), who tested 
the impact of distance on interstate commerce in the U.S. using data from the Commodity 
Flow Survey of the U.S. Census.  Both of these studies find a negative and significant 
effect of the distance variable. These studies also find a very significant “home-state 
bias” effect, as seen in the large coefficient estimate on a dummy for same state 
transactions, which suggests there are costs to trading across state borders that are not 
purely distance dependent.12  
 
When we run the regression with eBay data, we obtain results that have a sign consistent 
with prior studies.  In all the specifications of the regression, the coefficients on distance 
are negative and significant while the coefficients on the same state dummy are also 
                                                 
12 Specifically, Hillberry and Hummels (2003) show that the home-state bias found by Wolf (2000) 
diminishes once shipments from wholesalers, which tend to ship within state more than manufacturers, are 
excluded from the CFS data set. However, the same state coefficient continues to be economically and 
statistically significant.  
significant but positive.  These signs are robust  whether we measure trade by the number 
of transactions – the specification that we derived theoretically in the prior section – or by 
the dollar value of the trade, and whether we use the raw distance between the buyer and 
seller state or its log. 
 
When we compare our results to the models of reference we observe that the effect of 
distance in Internet trade is much smaller that in the Census data.  The coefficients of 
distance in the eBay regressions are roughly one tenth of the magnitude of the 
coefficients in Wolf (2000) and Hillberry and Hummels (2003).  However, the coefficient 
on same state is of similar level – about ½ that of Wolf and the same level of Hillberry 
and Hummels.  The combination of these two results seems to indicate that though eBay 
is fairly effective in mitigating the effect of distance in interstate commerce, a “home 
bias” still continues to exist. 
 
The analyses using the MercadoLibre data support these findings.  Table II shows the 
results of the analyses.  In the first three models, distance is measured by the distance 
between country capitals; in the last three, by the distance between provincial capitals.  
We observe a negative effect of distance that is attenuated by a very strong same country 
effect and a relatively strong same province effect. It is interesting to note from this 
analysis that the same country effect seems to be much stronger that the same province 
effect.  This difference may just be caused by the customs barriers, but it may also be due 
to an amplification of the frictions manifested in the “same province” effect. 
 
The question may arise of whether the same province effect is just a consequence of the 
larger number of buyers and sellers in the same states, particularly in states such as New 
York or California that concentrate a significant amount of traders.  We also ran the same 
analyses excluding buyers and sellers from New York and California, obtaining 
essentially the same results as those reported here. 
 
In summary, we find that the distance effect is present in both our samples.  It seems that 
the Internet reduces but is unable to completely eliminate the frictions that cause the 
impact of distance.  The powerful constraint of state borders raises the question of what 
causes this force and whether state lines are the critical distance point where a 
discontinuity occurs.  In the next sections we will review some of the frictions that have 
been pointed out as responsible for the distance effect, such as shipping costs, trust, and 
taxes, to test whether these frictions are still present in Internet commerce and whether 
state lines  are the only or even the most important point of discontinuity in the distance 
effect. 
 
IV.2 Frictions to Internet Trade 
 
In this section we analyze whether the distance effect observed in the prior section is 
explained by the same frictions that affect non-Internet trade, such as shipping costs, time 
zones, trust, or sales taxes.  We will give special consideration to the possible reasons 
behind the observed discontinuity at the state border. 
 
The most evident trade friction is shipping costs, which are likely to increase with 
distance.  Also, it is possible for transportation companies to have a two-tier pricing 
structure for interstate and intrastate transport, which gets reflected in the shipping cost 
quoted by sellers and would generate the same state effect.  In the previous section we 
assumed that the flat shipping & handling cost usually quoted in eBay listings was the 
norm.  In models I and II of Table III we relax this assumption by explicitly including the 
shipping cost in the regression framework.  Shipping costs have the expected negative, 
and statistically significant, impact on trade activity, and they seem to be partially 
responsible for the distance effect, as the coefficient on the distance variable falls when 
shipping costs are included.  However, this coefficient remains negative and significant, 
suggesting that shipping costs are only a partial explanation for the distance effect.  
Moreover, they do not seem to be behind the “home bias,” as the coefficient of the same 
state dummy remains positive, significant, and at about the same level.   
 
It is possible that the idiosyncratic culture of the Internet is responsible for the geographic 
pattern of trade.  For instance, previous research13 has shown that online bidders 
commonly wait to place their bids until just before the auction expires, a strategy known 
as sniping. This strategy may be more difficult to implement for a specific auction if 
buyer and seller are not in the same time zone.  To see if such a time zone difference 
confounds the physical distance effect, in Table III, Model II we include a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if buyer and seller are in the same time zone and 0 
otherwise.  The coefficient of this variable is not statistically significant and its inclusion 
has virtually no impact on the other variables of the model.  Thus, differences in time 
zones do not seem to explain the distance effect.  
 
We need to establish that the same state effect is not artificially induced by the states with 
the largest area.  If the effect of distance were completely linear, the size of the same state 
effect would be proportional to the average radius of transportation within the state.  If 
we were to consider state-specific dummy variables, geographically large states would 
have larger coefficients simply because their borders span larger markets.  One can argue 
that the same state effect observed before was caused by large amount of trade that 
occurred within the borders of the largest states.  Table III, Model III results suggest that 
this is not the case.  The coefficient on the same state dummy remains positive, 
significant, and approximately at the same level when we include individual dummies for 
the intrastate trade of the five largest states.  Moreover, in the case of California, the 
coefficient is negative and significant, perhaps because the influence of Silicon Valley 
makes Californians more comfortable with Internet commerce, or perhaps because the 
rest of the country is especially interested in items coming from California, a state known 
for setting trends in many cultural (and fashion) dimensions.   
 
One of the difficulties of trading with a distant party is the difficulty of exerting any 
recourse if the other party does not fulfill her obligation.  In the same way that the letter 
of credit was designed to address this issue in international trade, eBay has developed 
                                                 
13 See Roth and Ockenfels (2002), Bajari and Hortacsu (2004). 
15 See Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) for a survey of these results. 
several features that aim to increase the trust of users in the online commerce platform, 
including the electronic payment system Paypal, buyer protection, and a feedback system. 
Several papers in the empirical industrial organization literature show that bidders reduce 
their willingness to pay when they observe certain levels of negative feedback.15  If 
reputation is effective in mitigating the concerns of buyers for whom distance makes it 
difficult to exercise any recourse, we should observe that negative feedback generates a 
higher reduction in the willingness to pay of distant buyers.  In table III, we interact 
distance and the same state dummy with dummy variables that identify bad sellers (98-
99% rating) and very bad sellers (<98% rating).16  The significant coefficients in the 
interactions suggest that trust contributes to the effect of distance and the feedback 
system helps to mitigate, although not to completely eliminate, this effect.  Furthermore, 
the impact of negative feedback is less visible within the same state (the positive 
coefficient on the interaction term suggests that sellers with bad reputations are more 
likely to find a buyer in the same state), which is consistent with an interpretation of the 
same state effect that attributes the higher intensity of intrastate commerce to an 
increased possibility of direct enforcement of the trade agreement.   
 
Finally, taxes are often associated with geographic patterns of trade.  Goolsbee (1999) 
shows that Internet purchases are partially driven by sales tax optimization.  As a general 
rule, only intrastate Internet trade is subject to sales tax.  Thus, differences in the tax 
regime of the seller state should have no impact on trade except in the sense that when 
seller and buyer are in the same state they will be less likely to engage in trade, and even 
less likely if they are located in a state with a high sales tax.  This would normally 
suggest a negative coefficient on the same state dummy, contrary to the evidence above.  
However, if we were to have individual same state dummies for each state, it would be 
reasonable to expect a positive coefficient on the low-sales-tax-states’ dummies.  One 
may argue that the value of the coefficient may be affected by the undue influence of low 
or no sales tax states, though it is difficult to conceive how this could result in a positive 
coefficient on the same state dummy.  Models II and III of Table III provide no evidence 
                                                 
16 In our transaction data, 75% of sellers have better than 99% positive rating and 90% of sellers have better 
than 98% positive rating.  
of sales taxes causing the distance effect.  As expected, none of the interactions between 
the dummies identifying the tax regimes of the sellers and distance is significant.  
Moreover, when interacted with the same state dummy, coefficients do not monotonically 
increase as the sales tax rate falls, and even though the higher sales tax regime (absorbed 
in the intercept) has a negative, albeit insignificant, coefficient relative to the other 
regimes, it may be caused by the weight of California, an exception to the same state 
effect as we have seen above. 
 
In summary, although shipping costs seem to deter Internet commerce between distant 
buyer and seller, it only explains partially the effect of distance observed in online 
trading.  Moreover, trust seems to be the only variable that has some impact on the same 
state effect.  This finding is consistent with the possibility of a direct recourse in case of 
breach of contract, which provides a strong incentive for agents to keep trading 
relationships within limited radius.  The question that arises is whether state limits are the 
relevant distance for intense commerce or if shorter radii, such as city limits or driving 
distance, are more important. 
 
V. Results from Analyses Aggregated at the City Level 
 
The existence of a strong positive “same state” effect on intensity of Internet commerce 
suggests the existence of a sort of “trading gravity field” within which the intensity of 
transactional activity is much greater than outside.  Whether state borders or other 
milestones determine the reach of the attraction field is an empirical question.  In 
principle, we may hypothesize that the city limits, the county line, or a specific travel 
length are justifiable alternatives to the state border. 
 
To identify the point of discontinuity in the distance effect more precisely, we run a 
regression of the log of dollar value of trade between two cities on a series of dummy 
variables that take the value of 1 if the distance between buyer and seller is within a 
certain interval: a same city dummy and seller, and buyer city fixed effects.  We graph 
the coefficients of the distance dummy variables in Figure 1.  It is remarkable to observe 
how the coefficients for all the distance intervals have similar levels and decrease 
smoothly as the distance increases, whereas the same city coefficient is about eight times 
the other coefficients.  This result suggests that contrary to what one would expect, 
“driving distance” is relevant for commerce in the Internet.  In theory, the Internet would 
enable markets to extend their reach almost limitlessly, and even if that benefit is 
partially observed for all other levels of distance, the city limits seem to represent an 
important barrier to trade. 
 
In the prior section we found that the same state effect was at least partially caused by 
direct enforcement ability and mitigated by reputation mechanisms.  To explore what is 
behind the same city effect, we rerun the regression on distance dummies for each of the 
30 main item categories in eBay.  Table IV presents a ranked list of the coefficients of the 
same city dummy for the different categories.  An inspection of this list suggests several 
hypotheses.  First, we observe at the top of the list tickets and baseball cards, which are 
very location-specific items.  A person in Sacramento is less likely to buy a ticket to the 
Boston Lyric Opera than a Bostonian, and buyers in Minnesota are less likely to buy a 
Seattle Mariners card than a person in Seattle.  Thus, it seems that cultural factors have an 
important role in causing the same city effect.  However, we see at the bottom of the list 
items that also seem to have a strong cultural component, such as entertainment 
memorabilia, collectibles, coins, dolls, and bears.  In contrast with the baseball cards, 
those items are less location specific.  Moreover, these are items characterized by their 
uniqueness and for which buyers are more likely to expand geographically their search in 
order to buy them.  Thus, same city effect observed for these items is smaller.  Finally, a 
glance at Table IV may suggest that as we go up the list the average value and size of the 
items increases, consistent with shipping costs and trust being relevant forces behind the 
same city effect. 
 
Figure 2 plots the “same city” effects for different categories against the average sale 
price of items within that category. The plot reflects a strong positive correlation between 
item value and the “same city” bias. Similarly, Figure 3 plots the “same city” coefficient 
against a measure of seller reliability in an item category. This measure is computed for 
each item category as the percentage of negative comments in the median seller’s 
feedback record – a higher percentage of negatives indicates a less reliable seller. Once 
again, we see a strong positive correlation.  
 
We then regress the category specific coefficients of the same city dummies on the 
percentage of negative feedback in the median seller record and on the average weight 
and price of an item in the category.  Table V presents the results of the regression.  
Despite the potential attenuation bias caused by an estimated dependent variable, we 
observe a positive and significant effect of both the reputation measure and the average 
price in the category.  An interpretation of these results is that as the likelihood of a 
breach of contract increases (the seller has a more negative reputation), or as the cost of 
such a breach (value of the item) increases, it is more important to have the possibility of 
a direct enforcement mechanism, measured by proximity in the same city effect.  In 
contrast, the coefficient on weight is insignificant, albeit negative, suggesting that 
shipping costs, usually a function of weight, are not determinant of the same city effect.  
 
In summary, the results in this section support the hypothesis that despite the facilitation 
of search provided by the Internet, the city limits or “driving distance” cause an 
“attraction field” that concentrates an excessive amount of trade within them.  Cultural 
factors and the possibility of a direct enforcement action in case of breach of contract 
determine the existence/need of a local market even in the Internet space. 
 
Shill Bidding 
One of the strategies employed by eBay sellers to raise their selling price is to use a 
different screen name (alias) to bid on their own items, thereby forcing other buyers to 
raise their bids.  This practice, known as shilling, could be responsible for the geographic 
patterns of trade if (1) sellers won an extraordinary number of auctions; (2) sellers’ 
alternative aliases were registered in the same city; and (3) in the case of the eBay data, 
sellers used all screen names for both buying and selling items.  The three conditions do 
not seem very plausible: (1) if sellers won many auctions it would make the practice of 
shilling very expensive; (2) as being identified as a seller who shills would lead to 
negative feedback and, potentially, exclusion from the eBay community, sellers may try 
to hide their identity by registering their alternative alias in a different city; and (3) as the 
number of feedback comments is an element of reputation, it is optimal for sellers to 
concentrate their activity in a single account.  However, the gravity equation regression 
reveals a strong same city and distance effect when we restrict our analyses to 
transactions conducted using a buy-it-now price, which are not subject to shilling 
activities.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we analyze whether online auction sites have been able to create a virtual 
market in which the physical distance between buyer and seller becomes irrelevant.  
Using transactions data from two Internet auction platforms (eBay and MercadoLibre) we 
find that even though geographical distance is less of a deterrent to trade than it has been 
observed in studies of non-Internet commerce, faraway buyers are still less likely to 
engage in a purchase agreement than closer ones.  Furthermore, the geographical limits of 
a city, which we call driving distance, act as a field of attraction for transactions, so there 
is an abnormal concentration of commerce among buyers and sellers in the same city. 
 
Further analyses suggest that cultural factors and the possibility of direct contract 
enforcement in case of breach are the main reasons behind the same city effect.  The 
higher the likelihood of a breach (suggested by bad reputation of the seller), and the 
higher the cost of such a breach (more expensive items), the less likely a transaction 
between distant agents will take place.  Also, very location-specific items such as tickets 
and baseball cards tend to be traded in local markets.  Shipping costs, at least for 
intrastate U.S. trade, lightly deter distant trade, but their influence is too small to explain 
the bulk of the distance effect. 
 
Our findings have two implications for online commerce platforms that want to extend 
their reach.  First, they should continually innovate and perfect systems to increase the 
trust of market participants on their platforms.  Features such as continuous monitoring of 
listings, feedback systems, and buyer protection programs are of greater benefit more to 
distant agents who, in principle, are more defenseless than closer ones.  Second, in their 
expansion drive, they should pay more attention to specialty items, such as collectibles or 
coins: the uniqueness of these items makes agents more willing to engage in distant trade, 
and in addition, buyers are more likely to have heterogeneous valuations and therefore 
prices are more likely to rise if markets are expanded geographically. 
 
Future research could complement our findings by focusing on the impact of distance on 
prices at which items trade.  Particularly interesting would be the analysis of sellers who 
expand their geographical reach by listing the same item in different sites and/or list their 
items in different languages.  Another revealing study would analyze how distant and 
close buyers differ in their bidding behavior throughout an auction. 
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Figure 1 
Impact of Distance on Internet Trade 
In this figure we graph the ratio between the coefficients in a trade regression of the different intervals of 
distance and the coefficient of very long distance (>4000 Km).  We use a stratified sample of eBay listings 
with US buyers and sellers taken between February and May 2004.  We run a regression of the log of dollar 
value of trade between two cities on a series of dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the distance 
between buyer and seller is within a certain interval: a same city dummy and seller, and buyer city fixed 
effects. 
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Figure 2: Same city bias vs. average object price in category
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Figure 3: Same city bias vs. median seller reputation in category
Table I 
Impact of Distance on eBay Trade 
In this table we regress measures of interstate trade on distance and economy size.  We use a stratified 
sample of eBay listings with US buyers and sellers taken between February and May 2004.  The dependent 
variable – intrastate trade – is measured in models 1-3 by the log of the number of transactions between 
state s (seller) and state b (buyer) while in models 4 and 5 it is measured by the log of the dollar value of 
these transactions.  We measure distance as the great-circle distance between state capitals. For intrastate 
distances we use Wolf's (2000) formula, which utilizes the (population weighted) distance between the two 
most populous cities within a state.  SAME_STATE is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if buyer 
and seller are located in the same state and 0 otherwise.  The total number of transactions with state sellers 
or buyers proxies for the size of the economy.  Models VI and VII are included for comparison purposes 
and present the results of Wolf (2000) and Hillberry and Hummels (2003).  All coefficients are significant 
at the 1% level. 
 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII 
       Hillberry & 
 EBay eBay eBay eBay eBay 
Wolf 
(2000) 
Hummels 
(2003) 
 ln(# trans) ln(# trans) ln(# trans) ln($ sales) ln($ sales) 1993 CFS 1997 CFSa 
        
DISTANCE_sb -0.096             
(1000km)        
        
ln(DISTANCE_sb) -0.127 -0.055 -0.10 -0.08 -1.00 -1.05 
        
SAME_STATE   0.43 0.64 0.63 1.48 0.44 
        
ln(T_s) 1.01 0.99 0.97 0.98 (seller f.e.) 1.02 (seller f.e.) 
        
ln(T_b) 1.01 0.99 0.97 0.82 (buyer f.e.) 0.98 (buyer f.e.) 
        
Observations 2297 2297 2297 2297 2297 2304 2304 
Adj. R^2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.93 0.84 0.91 
        
a Excluding shipments by wholesalers 
Notes:  Wolf (2000) and Hillberry-Hummels (2003) use the Commodity Flow Survey of the U.S. Census, which covers a 
representative sample of shipment from U.S. mining, manufacturing, and wholesale establishments.  
Wolf (2000) uses driving distances obtained from Rand-McNally.  
Hillberry and Hummels (2003) use actual shipping distances collected by the Commodity Flow Survey.  
 
Table II 
Impact of Distance on MercadoLibre Trade 
In this table we analyze the impact of distance on international and interprovince trade through the Internet.  
The sample includes all the transactions completed in the MercadoLibre sites during the period August 
2003 to July 2004.  The dependent variable is measured the log of the dollar value of the transactions 
between country/province s (seller) and country/province b (buyer).  For models 1-3 the geography unit is 
the country while in models 4-6 is the province.  We measure distance as the great-circle distance between 
state capitals. For intrastate distances we use Wolf's (2000) formula, which utilizes the (population 
weighted) distance between the two most populous cities within a state.  SAME COUNTRY is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if buyer and seller are located in the same country and 0 otherwise.  
SAME PROVINCE is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if buyer and seller are located in the same 
province and 0 otherwise.   
 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
       
       
ln(DISTANCE_sb) -2.904 -0.546 -0.194 -1.562 -0.382 -0.393 
 (0.000) (0.296) (0.676) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
SAME PROVINCE     1.011  
     (0.000)  
       
SAME COUNTRY  10.814   6.068 6.049 
  (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
       
       
Seller fixed effects Country country country province province province 
Buyer fixed effects country country country province province province 
Observations 79 79 69 7175 7175 6968 
Adj. R^2 0.48 0.69 0.57 0.41 0.69 0.69 
       
   
Table III 
Impact of Distance on eBay Trade 
The Role of Shipping Costs, Time Zone, and Large States 
In this table we test whether the effect of distance on interstate trade is caused by shipping costs, 
differences in time zone among states, or by the influence of large states in the regressions.  We use a 
stratified sample of eBay listings with US buyer and seller taken between February and May 2004.  The 
dependent variable is the log of the dollar value of transactions between state s (seller) and state b (buyer).  
We measure distance as the great-circle distance between state capitals. For intrastate distances we use 
Wolf's (2000) formula, which utilizes the (population weighted) distance between the two most populous 
cities within a state.  SAME_STATE is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if buyer and seller are 
located in the same state and 0 otherwise.  SHIPPING COST is the average transportation cost for 
shipments from state s to state b in percentage.  SAME TIME ZONE is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if buyer and seller and in states with the same time zone and 0 otherwise. 
 
 Model I Model II Model III 
 
Shipping 
Rate Time Zone 
Large 
States 
    
ln(DISTANCE_AB) -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.15*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) 
SAME STATE 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.72*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
SHIPPING COST (%) -0.03*** -0.03***  
 (0.01) (0.01)  
SAME TIME ZONE  0.04  
  (0.03)  
SAME STATE CA   -0.80*** 
   (0.08) 
SAME STATE NY   0.27*** 
   (0.10) 
SAME STATE FL   1.80*** 
   (0.13) 
SAME STATE TX   0.14 
   (0.13) 
SAME STATE MT   4.57*** 
   (1.02) 
    
Seller state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Buyer state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations    
Adj. R^2    
    
Note: State abbreviations: CA (California); NY (New York); FL 
(Florida); TX (Texas); MT (Montana). 
 
Table III 
Impact of Distance on eBay Trade.  The Role of Trust and Taxes 
In this table we test whether the effect of distance on interstate trade is caused by taxes or trust.  We use a 
stratified sample of eBay listings with US buyer and seller taken between February and May 2004.  The 
dependent variable is the log of the dollar value of transactions between state s (seller) and state b (buyer).  
We measure distance as the great-circle distance between state capitals. For intrastate distances we use 
Wolf's (2000) formula, which utilizes the (population weighted) distance between the two most populous 
cities within a state.  SAME_STATE is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if buyer and seller are 
located in the same state and 0 otherwise.  BAD SELLER is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the seller has a rating between 98% and 99% and 0 otherwise.  VERY BAD SELLER is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1if the seller has a rating below 98% and 0 otherwise. (TAX==X%) are dummy 
variables to account for the level of state sales taxes; state rates are rounded up to the numbers included; 
states with sales tax rate equal to or higher than 7% (e.g. CA) are captured by the intercept. 
 Model I Model II Model III
Seller feedback Sales Feedback & Taxes
ln(DISTANCE) -0.09*** -0.10** -0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) 
SAME STATE 0.42*** -0.01 -0.07 
 (0.06) (0.18) (0.18) 
ln(DISTANCE)*BAD_SELLER -0.01**   -0.01** 
 (0.005)  (0.004) 
ln(DISTANCE)*VERY BAD SELLER -0.02**  -0.02** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
SAME STATE * BAD SELLER 0.60***  0.34*** 
 (0.07)  (0.11) 
SAME STATE * VERY BAD SELLER 0.68***  0.40 
 (0.24)  (0.25) 
LN(DISTANCE) * (TAX==6%)   0.02 0.03 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
LN(DISTANCE) * (TAX==5%)  -0.04 -0.02 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
LN(DISTANCE) * (TAX==4%)  0.004 0.02 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
LN(DISTANCE) * (TAX==3%)  0.13 0.15 
  (0.09) (0.09) 
LN(DISTANCE) * (TAX==0%)  -0.10 -0.08 
  (0.08) (0.08) 
SAME STATE * (TAX==6%)  0.84*** 0.64*** 
  (0.22) (0.24) 
SAME STATE * (TAX==5%)  0.61*** 0.64*** 
  (0.20) (0.20) 
SAME STATE * (TAX==4%)  0.98*** 0.83*** 
  (0.21) (0.22) 
SAME STATE * (TAX==3%)  1.07*** 1.11*** 
  (0.33) (0.33) 
SAME STATE * (TAX==0%)  0.62** 0.54 
  (0.35) (0.35) 
Seller state fixed effects    
Buyer state fixed effects    
Observations    
Adj R^2 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Table IV 
Impact of Distance on Trade Patterns of Different Types of Goods 
In this table we rank the coefficients of the same city dummy variables in regressions of measures of 
intrastate trade on distance and economy size by category of good traded.  We use a stratified sample of 
eBay listings with US buyer and seller taken between February and May 2004.  We run the regression for 
each of the 30 main categories of goods in eBay.  The dependent variable is the log of the dollar value of 
the transactions between state s (seller) and state b (buyer).  We measure distance as the great-circle 
distance between state capitals. For intrastate distances we use Wolf's (2000) formula, which utilizes the 
(population weighted) distance between the two most populous cities within a state.  SAME_CITY is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if buyer and seller are located in the same state and 0 otherwise.   
 
Category 
Exp("Same city" 
coefficient) 
Tickets 3.049 
Sports Memorabilia, Cards & Fan 
Shops 1.571 
Jewelry & Watches 1.111 
Consumer Electronics 1.085 
Home & Garden 0.954 
Business & Industrial 0.913 
Cameras & Photo 0.83 
Travel/Luggage 0.788 
Computers & Networking 0.75 
Toys & Hobbies 0.706 
Antiques 0.684 
Pottery & Glass 0.663 
Clothing, Shoes & Accessories 0.658 
Video Games 0.639 
Stamps 0.635 
Sporting Goods 0.629 
Musical Instruments 0.613 
Gift Certificates 0.584 
DVDs & Movies 0.532 
Music 0.526 
Art 0.499 
Entertainment Memorabilia 0.448 
Books 0.446 
Collectibles 0.439 
Health & Beauty 0.438 
Coins 0.375 
Everything Else 0.347 
Dolls & Bears 0.288 
Crafts 0.201 
Table V 
Impact of Distance on Trade Patterns of Different Types of Goods 
In this table we regress the impact of distance on trade on characteristics of the goods traded and the 
reputation of their sellers. The dependent variable is the coefficient of the same city dummy variables from 
regressions of measures of intrastate trade on distance and economy size by category of good traded.  We 
use a stratified sample of eBay listings with US buyer and seller taken between February and May 2004.  
We exclude from the regression the categories with extreme same city coefficients.  E[Weight] and 
E[Price] are the average weight and price respectively of the goods sold in the category.  Seller’s reputation 
is measured by the median percentage of negative feedback received by sellers in the category. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Coefficient on SAME_CITY 
  
  
E[Weight] in Category -0.021 
 (0.014) 
  
%Negatives in Median Seller's Record 1.112 
 (0.307)*** 
  
E[Price] in Category 0.0047 
 (0.0012)*** 
  
  
Observations 27 
R^2 0.53 
 
